mirror of
https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
synced 2026-06-21 06:11:45 +00:00
security(oauth): harden OAuth 2.1/MCP implementation (Critical + High + Medium findings)
Address 14 security findings from internal review of the OAuth 2.1 + MCP layer: Critical: - C1: Scope-gate all MCP resources (trips, budget, packing, collab, atlas, vacay, etc.) - C2: Wire token/session revocation into active MCP session lifecycle per (user, client_id) - C3: Refresh-token replay detection via parent_token_id chain + cascade revoke on replay High: - H1: Validate PKCE code_challenge (43-char base64url) and code_verifier (43–128 chars) format - H2: Rate-limit /oauth/token (30/min), /authorize/validate (30/min), /oauth/revoke (10/min) - H3: Strip client metadata from unauthenticated /authorize/validate responses (oracle prevention) - H4: Constant-time secret comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (prevents timing attacks) - H5: Collapse all invalid_grant cases to a single generic message; log specifics server-side Medium: - M1: Set Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache on token endpoint responses - M2: Return 404 (not 200/403) on discovery + revoke endpoints when MCP addon is disabled - M4: Audit-log all OAuth lifecycle events (create, consent, issue, refresh, revoke, replay) - M5: Union consent scopes on re-authorization instead of replacing existing grants - M7: Require httpOnly cookie auth (not Bearer JWT) on all state-mutating OAuth endpoints - M8: Strict Bearer scheme check in MCP token verification Refactoring: - Extract MCP session management (sessions Map, revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient) into mcp/sessionManager.ts to break the circular dependency between oauthService and mcp/index - Extract verifyJwtAndLoadUser helper in auth middleware, shared by authenticate and new requireCookieAuth middleware Tests: - Fix all existing integration tests broken by the security hardening (OAUTH-019 to OAUTH-032) - Add 13 new integration tests covering M1, M2, H1, H3, H5, M5, M7, C3 - Add 14 new unit tests covering C2, C3, H1, H3, M5 behaviors in oauthService
This commit is contained in:
jubnl
@@ -4,15 +4,21 @@ import { isAddonEnabled } from './adminService';
|
||||
import { validateScopes } from '../mcp/scopes';
|
||||
import { ADDON_IDS } from '../addons';
|
||||
import { User } from '../types';
|
||||
import { writeAudit, logWarn } from './auditLog';
|
||||
import { revokeUserSessionsForClient } from '../mcp/sessionManager';
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Constants
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S = 60 * 60; // 1 hour
|
||||
const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days rolling
|
||||
const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S = 60 * 60; // 1 hour
|
||||
const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days rolling
|
||||
const AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000; // 2 minutes
|
||||
|
||||
// PKCE format (RFC 7636)
|
||||
const CODE_CHALLENGE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
|
||||
const CODE_VERIFIER_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-._~]{43,128}$/;
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// In-memory auth code store (short-lived, no need for DB persistence)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +67,7 @@ interface OAuthTokenRow {
|
||||
access_token_expires_at: string;
|
||||
refresh_token_expires_at: string;
|
||||
revoked_at: string | null;
|
||||
parent_token_id: number | null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -71,6 +78,14 @@ function hashToken(raw: string): string {
|
||||
return createHash('sha256').update(raw).digest('hex');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Constant-time comparison of two hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes. */
|
||||
function timingSafeEqualHex(a: string, b: string): boolean {
|
||||
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a, 'hex'), Buffer.from(b, 'hex'));
|
||||
} catch { return false; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function generateAccessToken(): string {
|
||||
return 'trekoa_' + randomBytes(24).toString('hex');
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -99,6 +114,7 @@ export function createOAuthClient(
|
||||
name: string,
|
||||
redirectUris: string[],
|
||||
allowedScopes: string[],
|
||||
ip?: string | null,
|
||||
): { error?: string; status?: number; client?: Record<string, unknown> } {
|
||||
if (!name?.trim()) return { error: 'Name is required', status: 400 };
|
||||
if (name.trim().length > 100) return { error: 'Name must be 100 characters or less', status: 400 };
|
||||
@@ -136,6 +152,8 @@ export function createOAuthClient(
|
||||
'SELECT id, user_id, name, client_id, redirect_uris, allowed_scopes, created_at FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ?'
|
||||
).get(id) as OAuthClientRow;
|
||||
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId, action: 'oauth.client.create', details: { client_id: clientId, name: name.trim() }, ip });
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
client: {
|
||||
id: row.id,
|
||||
@@ -153,8 +171,9 @@ export function createOAuthClient(
|
||||
export function rotateOAuthClientSecret(
|
||||
userId: number,
|
||||
clientRowId: string,
|
||||
ip?: string | null,
|
||||
): { error?: string; status?: number; client_secret?: string } {
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(clientRowId, userId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id, client_id FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(clientRowId, userId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
|
||||
if (!row) return { error: 'Client not found', status: 404 };
|
||||
|
||||
const rawSecret = 'trekcs_' + randomBytes(24).toString('hex');
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +182,13 @@ export function rotateOAuthClientSecret(
|
||||
db.prepare('UPDATE oauth_clients SET client_secret_hash = ? WHERE id = ?').run(secretHash, clientRowId);
|
||||
|
||||
// Revoke all existing tokens for this client so old sessions are invalidated
|
||||
db.prepare("UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = datetime('now') WHERE client_id = (SELECT client_id FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ?) AND revoked_at IS NULL").run(clientRowId);
|
||||
db.prepare("UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = datetime('now') WHERE client_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL").run(row.client_id);
|
||||
|
||||
// Terminate active MCP sessions for this (user, client) pair
|
||||
|
||||
revokeUserSessionsForClient(userId, row.client_id);
|
||||
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId, action: 'oauth.client.rotate_secret', details: { client_id: row.client_id }, ip });
|
||||
|
||||
return { client_secret: rawSecret };
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -171,10 +196,12 @@ export function rotateOAuthClientSecret(
|
||||
export function deleteOAuthClient(
|
||||
userId: number,
|
||||
clientRowId: string,
|
||||
ip?: string | null,
|
||||
): { error?: string; status?: number; success?: boolean } {
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(clientRowId, userId);
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id, client_id FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(clientRowId, userId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
|
||||
if (!row) return { error: 'Client not found', status: 404 };
|
||||
db.prepare('DELETE FROM oauth_clients WHERE id = ?').run(clientRowId);
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId, action: 'oauth.client.delete', details: { client_id: row.client_id }, ip });
|
||||
return { success: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -214,10 +241,14 @@ export function getConsent(clientId: string, userId: number): string[] | null {
|
||||
return row ? JSON.parse(row.scopes) : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function saveConsent(clientId: string, userId: number, scopes: string[]): void {
|
||||
export function saveConsent(clientId: string, userId: number, scopes: string[], ip?: string | null): void {
|
||||
// Union existing consent with newly approved scopes (M5: never narrow stored consent)
|
||||
const existing = getConsent(clientId, userId) ?? [];
|
||||
const merged = Array.from(new Set([...existing, ...scopes]));
|
||||
db.prepare(
|
||||
'INSERT OR REPLACE INTO oauth_consents (client_id, user_id, scopes, updated_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)'
|
||||
).run(clientId, userId, JSON.stringify(scopes));
|
||||
).run(clientId, userId, JSON.stringify(merged));
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId, action: 'oauth.consent.grant', details: { client_id: clientId, scopes: merged }, ip });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function isConsentSufficient(existingScopes: string[], requestedScopes: string[]): boolean {
|
||||
@@ -232,6 +263,7 @@ export function issueTokens(
|
||||
clientId: string,
|
||||
userId: number,
|
||||
scopes: string[],
|
||||
parentTokenId: number | null = null,
|
||||
): {
|
||||
access_token: string;
|
||||
refresh_token: string;
|
||||
@@ -250,9 +282,9 @@ export function issueTokens(
|
||||
|
||||
db.prepare(`
|
||||
INSERT INTO oauth_tokens
|
||||
(client_id, user_id, access_token_hash, refresh_token_hash, scopes, access_token_expires_at, refresh_token_expires_at)
|
||||
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|
||||
`).run(clientId, userId, accessHash, refreshHash, JSON.stringify(scopes), accessExpiry.toISOString(), refreshExpiry.toISOString());
|
||||
(client_id, user_id, access_token_hash, refresh_token_hash, scopes, access_token_expires_at, refresh_token_expires_at, parent_token_id)
|
||||
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|
||||
`).run(clientId, userId, accessHash, refreshHash, JSON.stringify(scopes), accessExpiry.toISOString(), refreshExpiry.toISOString(), parentTokenId);
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
access_token: rawAccess,
|
||||
@@ -270,13 +302,14 @@ export function issueTokens(
|
||||
export interface OAuthTokenInfo {
|
||||
user: User;
|
||||
scopes: string[];
|
||||
clientId: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function getUserByAccessToken(rawToken: string): OAuthTokenInfo | null {
|
||||
const hash = hashToken(rawToken);
|
||||
const row = db.prepare(`
|
||||
SELECT ot.scopes, ot.revoked_at, ot.access_token_expires_at,
|
||||
ot.user_id, u.username, u.email, u.role
|
||||
ot.user_id, ot.client_id, u.username, u.email, u.role
|
||||
FROM oauth_tokens ot
|
||||
JOIN users u ON ot.user_id = u.id
|
||||
WHERE ot.access_token_hash = ?
|
||||
@@ -289,50 +322,122 @@ export function getUserByAccessToken(rawToken: string): OAuthTokenInfo | null {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
user: { id: row.user_id, username: row.username, email: row.email, role: row.role as 'admin' | 'user' },
|
||||
scopes: JSON.parse(row.scopes),
|
||||
clientId: row.client_id,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Token refresh (rotation)
|
||||
// Token refresh (rotation + replay detection)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/** Walk parent_token_id upward to find the root token id of this rotation chain. */
|
||||
function findChainRoot(tokenId: number): number {
|
||||
let current = tokenId;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id, parent_token_id FROM oauth_tokens WHERE id = ?').get(current) as { id: number; parent_token_id: number | null } | undefined;
|
||||
if (!row || row.parent_token_id === null) return current;
|
||||
current = row.parent_token_id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return current;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Revoke all tokens in the rotation chain rooted at rootId. Returns affected ids. */
|
||||
function revokeChain(rootId: number): number[] {
|
||||
const rows = db.prepare(`
|
||||
WITH RECURSIVE chain(id) AS (
|
||||
SELECT id FROM oauth_tokens WHERE id = ?
|
||||
UNION ALL
|
||||
SELECT t.id FROM oauth_tokens t JOIN chain c ON t.parent_token_id = c.id
|
||||
)
|
||||
SELECT id FROM chain
|
||||
`).all(rootId) as { id: number }[];
|
||||
const ids = rows.map(r => r.id);
|
||||
if (ids.length > 0) {
|
||||
db.prepare(
|
||||
`UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id IN (${ids.map(() => '?').join(',')}) AND revoked_at IS NULL`
|
||||
).run(...ids);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ids;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function refreshTokens(
|
||||
rawRefreshToken: string,
|
||||
clientId: string,
|
||||
clientSecret: string,
|
||||
ip?: string | null,
|
||||
): { error?: string; status?: number; tokens?: ReturnType<typeof issueTokens> } {
|
||||
const client = db.prepare('SELECT client_id, client_secret_hash FROM oauth_clients WHERE client_id = ?').get(clientId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
|
||||
if (!client) return { error: 'invalid_client', status: 401 };
|
||||
if (hashToken(clientSecret) !== client.client_secret_hash) return { error: 'invalid_client', status: 401 };
|
||||
if (!timingSafeEqualHex(hashToken(clientSecret), client.client_secret_hash)) return { error: 'invalid_client', status: 401 };
|
||||
|
||||
const hash = hashToken(rawRefreshToken);
|
||||
const row = db.prepare(`
|
||||
SELECT id, client_id, user_id, scopes, refresh_token_expires_at, revoked_at
|
||||
SELECT id, client_id, user_id, scopes, refresh_token_expires_at, revoked_at, parent_token_id
|
||||
FROM oauth_tokens WHERE refresh_token_hash = ?
|
||||
`).get(hash) as OAuthTokenRow | undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!row) return { error: 'invalid_grant', status: 400 };
|
||||
if (row.client_id !== clientId) return { error: 'invalid_grant', status: 400 };
|
||||
if (row.revoked_at) return { error: 'invalid_grant', status: 400 };
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- Replay detection (C3) ----
|
||||
if (row.revoked_at) {
|
||||
// A revoked refresh token was replayed — assume token theft. Cascade-revoke the chain.
|
||||
const rootId = findChainRoot(row.id);
|
||||
revokeChain(rootId);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
revokeUserSessionsForClient(row.user_id, clientId);
|
||||
|
||||
writeAudit({
|
||||
userId: row.user_id,
|
||||
action: 'oauth.token.replay_detected',
|
||||
details: { client_id: clientId },
|
||||
ip,
|
||||
});
|
||||
logWarn(`[OAuth] Refresh token replay detected for user=${row.user_id} client=${clientId} ip=${ip ?? '-'}`);
|
||||
|
||||
return { error: 'invalid_grant', status: 400 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (new Date(row.refresh_token_expires_at) < new Date()) return { error: 'invalid_grant', status: 400 };
|
||||
|
||||
// Revoke old pair immediately (rotation)
|
||||
// Revoke old pair immediately (rotation) and issue new pair linked to old row
|
||||
db.prepare('UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?').run(row.id);
|
||||
|
||||
return { tokens: issueTokens(clientId, row.user_id, JSON.parse(row.scopes)) };
|
||||
// Terminate active MCP sessions for the old token's client so client must re-authenticate
|
||||
|
||||
revokeUserSessionsForClient(row.user_id, clientId);
|
||||
|
||||
const tokens = issueTokens(clientId, row.user_id, JSON.parse(row.scopes), row.id);
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId: row.user_id, action: 'oauth.token.refresh', details: { client_id: clientId }, ip });
|
||||
|
||||
return { tokens };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Token revocation
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
export function revokeToken(rawToken: string, clientId: string): void {
|
||||
export function revokeToken(rawToken: string, clientId: string, userId?: number, ip?: string | null): void {
|
||||
const hash = hashToken(rawToken);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get the user_id for the token so we can revoke its MCP sessions
|
||||
const row = db.prepare(
|
||||
'SELECT user_id FROM oauth_tokens WHERE (access_token_hash = ? OR refresh_token_hash = ?) AND client_id = ?'
|
||||
).get(hash, hash, clientId) as { user_id: number } | undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
db.prepare(`
|
||||
UPDATE oauth_tokens
|
||||
SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
|
||||
WHERE (access_token_hash = ? OR refresh_token_hash = ?) AND client_id = ?
|
||||
`).run(hash, hash, clientId);
|
||||
|
||||
const affectedUserId = row?.user_id ?? userId;
|
||||
if (affectedUserId) {
|
||||
|
||||
revokeUserSessionsForClient(affectedUserId, clientId);
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId: affectedUserId, action: 'oauth.token.revoke', details: { client_id: clientId, method: 'token' }, ip });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -356,10 +461,18 @@ export function listOAuthSessions(userId: number): Record<string, unknown>[] {
|
||||
export function revokeSession(
|
||||
userId: number,
|
||||
sessionId: number,
|
||||
ip?: string | null,
|
||||
): { error?: string; status?: number; success?: boolean } {
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM oauth_tokens WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(sessionId, userId);
|
||||
const row = db.prepare('SELECT id, client_id FROM oauth_tokens WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').get(sessionId, userId) as { id: number; client_id: string } | undefined;
|
||||
if (!row) return { error: 'Session not found', status: 404 };
|
||||
|
||||
db.prepare('UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?').run(sessionId);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
revokeUserSessionsForClient(userId, row.client_id);
|
||||
|
||||
writeAudit({ userId, action: 'oauth.token.revoke', details: { client_id: row.client_id, method: 'session' }, ip });
|
||||
|
||||
return { success: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -405,6 +518,11 @@ export function validateAuthorizeRequest(
|
||||
return { valid: false, error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'PKCE with code_challenge_method=S256 is required (OAuth 2.1)' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// H1: Enforce code_challenge format (RFC 7636 §4.2)
|
||||
if (!CODE_CHALLENGE_RE.test(params.code_challenge)) {
|
||||
return { valid: false, error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'code_challenge must be 43 base64url characters (S256)' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!params.client_id) {
|
||||
return { valid: false, error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'client_id is required' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -433,12 +551,9 @@ export function validateAuthorizeRequest(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (userId === null) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
valid: true,
|
||||
client: { name: client.name, allowed_scopes: allowedScopes },
|
||||
scopes: grantedScopes,
|
||||
loginRequired: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// H3: return only the minimum required fields — do NOT expose scopes, client.name, or
|
||||
// allowed_scopes to unauthenticated callers to prevent client enumeration.
|
||||
return { valid: true, loginRequired: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const existingConsent = getConsent(params.client_id, userId);
|
||||
@@ -457,8 +572,15 @@ export function validateAuthorizeRequest(
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
export function verifyPKCE(codeVerifier: string, codeChallenge: string): boolean {
|
||||
// H1: validate code_verifier format before hashing
|
||||
if (!CODE_VERIFIER_RE.test(codeVerifier)) return false;
|
||||
|
||||
const expected = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(codeVerifier).digest('base64url');
|
||||
return expected === codeChallenge;
|
||||
// Constant-time compare (both are base64url strings of equal length for S256)
|
||||
if (expected.length !== codeChallenge.length) return false;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected), Buffer.from(codeChallenge));
|
||||
} catch { return false; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -468,6 +590,7 @@ export function verifyPKCE(codeVerifier: string, codeChallenge: string): boolean
|
||||
export function authenticateClient(clientId: string, clientSecret: string): OAuthClientRow | null {
|
||||
const client = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM oauth_clients WHERE client_id = ?').get(clientId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
|
||||
if (!client) return null;
|
||||
if (hashToken(clientSecret) !== client.client_secret_hash) return null;
|
||||
// H4: constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channel
|
||||
if (!timingSafeEqualHex(hashToken(clientSecret), client.client_secret_hash)) return null;
|
||||
return client;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user