diff --git a/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy.ts b/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy.ts
index d37ea4fc2..168c7056a 100644
--- a/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy.ts
+++ b/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy.ts
@@ -106,13 +106,29 @@ export function dgramConnectTarget(args: unknown[]): string | null {
   return typeof args[1] === 'string' ? (args[1] as string) : null;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Node's `net.connect()` pre-normalises its arguments into an `[options, callback]`
+ * array and then calls `Socket.prototype.connect` with THAT ARRAY as the single
+ * argument. undici's plain-HTTP connector takes this path; its TLS connector does
+ * not — which is why HTTPS egress worked and plain HTTP silently did not.
+ *
+ * Unwrap it before anything reads `host`/`path`, or those come back undefined off an
+ * array, every plain-HTTP request a plugin makes is misclassified as `localhost`, and
+ * it is rejected with a nonsense "localhost is not in the plugin's declared hosts".
+ */
+export function unwrapConnectArgs(args: unknown[]): unknown[] {
+  return Array.isArray(args[0]) ? (args[0] as unknown[]) : args;
+}
+
 /**
  * Classify a `net.Socket.connect(...)` argument list into what we must check:
  * a unix-socket/pipe (local, allowed), a literal IP (checked synchronously), or
  * a hostname (allowlist + a DNS-resolving guard). Mirrors Node's connect
- * overloads: connect(options[,cb]) | connect(port[,host][,cb]) | connect(path[,cb]).
+ * overloads: connect(options[,cb]) | connect(port[,host][,cb]) | connect(path[,cb]),
+ * plus the pre-normalised array form above.
  */
-export function classifyConnect(args: unknown[], isIP: (s: string) => boolean): ConnectTarget {
+export function classifyConnect(rawArgs: unknown[], isIP: (s: string) => boolean): ConnectTarget {
+  const args = unwrapConnectArgs(rawArgs);
   const first = args[0];
   if (first && typeof first === 'object') {
     const o = first as { host?: string; path?: string };
diff --git a/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/plugin-host-entry.ts b/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/plugin-host-entry.ts
index 6bd7e592b..a60b82039 100644
--- a/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/plugin-host-entry.ts
+++ b/server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/plugin-host-entry.ts
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import dns from 'node:dns';
 import dgram from 'node:dgram';
 import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
 import { createPluginContext, definePlugin, PLUGIN_API_VERSION, type ChildTransport, type PluginContext, type PluginDefinition } from './plugin-sdk';
-import { isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect, dgramSendTarget, dgramConnectTarget } from './egress-policy';
+import { isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect, unwrapConnectArgs, dgramSendTarget, dgramConnectTarget } from './egress-policy';
 import type { Envelope, RpcError } from '../protocol/envelope';
 
 const pluginId = process.argv[2] || process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_ID || 'unknown';
@@ -434,7 +434,11 @@ function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
 
   const proto = net.Socket.prototype as unknown as { connect: (...a: unknown[]) => unknown };
   const realConnect = proto.connect;
-  proto.connect = function (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]): unknown {
+  proto.connect = function (this: unknown, ...rawArgs: unknown[]): unknown {
+    // Node hands the pre-normalised [options, cb] array in as a single argument on the
+    // net.connect() path (undici uses it for plain HTTP). Work from the unwrapped list,
+    // or the rebuild below spreads an array into {0: options, 1: cb} and Node rejects it.
+    const args = unwrapConnectArgs(rawArgs);
     const target = classifyConnect(args, (s) => net.isIP(s) !== 0);
     if (target.kind === 'local') {
       // A unix-socket / named-pipe connect is a host-local pivot — a malicious plugin
@@ -443,7 +447,7 @@ function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
       // Refuse it under the SAME policy: blocked by default, allowed only when the
       // operator explicitly opted into private egress.
       if (blockPrivate) throw new Error(`egress: connecting to a local socket/pipe (${target.host}) is not allowed`);
-      return realConnect.apply(this, args);
+      return realConnect.apply(this, rawArgs);
     }
     if (!allowed(target.host)) {
       throw new Error(`egress: ${target.host} is not in the plugin's declared hosts`);
@@ -452,7 +456,7 @@ function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
       if (blockPrivate && isBlockedIp(target.host)) {
         throw new Error(`egress: ${target.host} is a blocked address`);
       }
-      return realConnect.apply(this, args);
+      return realConnect.apply(this, rawArgs);
     }
     // Hostname: inject the resolving guard. Preserve an existing lookup by
     // wrapping the args' options object.
diff --git a/server/src/nest/plugins/supervisor/plugin-supervisor.ts b/server/src/nest/plugins/supervisor/plugin-supervisor.ts
index ea4329d5f..ecc87642f 100644
--- a/server/src/nest/plugins/supervisor/plugin-supervisor.ts
+++ b/server/src/nest/plugins/supervisor/plugin-supervisor.ts
@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ export class PluginSupervisor {
         TZ: process.env.TZ ?? '',
         PATH: process.env.PATH ?? '',
         TREK_PLUGIN_ID: sup.id,
+        // The egress guard that reads this runs INSIDE the child, and the child's env
+        // is scrubbed — so without forwarding it here the documented opt-out is dead
+        // code and a plugin can never reach a self-hoster's LAN service (a Gotify, an
+        // ntfy, an Ollama) no matter what the admin sets. Forwarded only when set, so
+        // the default stays the secure block-private policy.
+        ...(process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS
+          ? { TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS: process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS }
+          : {}),
       },
     });
     sup.child = child;
diff --git a/server/tests/unit/plugins/egress-policy.test.ts b/server/tests/unit/plugins/egress-policy.test.ts
index 4c67865f6..15db1c3a1 100644
--- a/server/tests/unit/plugins/egress-policy.test.ts
+++ b/server/tests/unit/plugins/egress-policy.test.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
 import net from 'node:net';
 import {
-  isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect, dgramSendTarget, dgramConnectTarget,
+  isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect, unwrapConnectArgs, dgramSendTarget, dgramConnectTarget,
 } from '../../../src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy';
 
 const isIP = (s: string) => net.isIP(s) !== 0;
@@ -116,3 +116,57 @@ describe('dgramConnectTarget', () => {
     expect(dgramConnectTarget([53, () => {}])).toBeNull();
   });
 });
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Node's pre-normalised connect args (the plain-HTTP egress bug)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// net.connect() normalises its arguments into an [options, callback] array and calls
+// Socket.prototype.connect with THAT ARRAY as the single argument. undici's plain-HTTP
+// connector goes through this path; its TLS connector does not.
+//
+// Before unwrapConnectArgs, `host` read as undefined off the array and classifyConnect
+// fell back to 'localhost' — so EVERY plain-HTTP request a plugin made was misclassified
+// and refused with "localhost is not in the plugin's declared hosts", no matter which
+// host it had declared. It only escaped notice because the sole shipped egress plugin
+// uses HTTPS.
+
+describe('unwrapConnectArgs (pre-normalised connect args)', () => {
+  // Exactly what undici's plain-HTTP connector produces.
+  const normalised = [[{ highWaterMark: 65536, localAddress: null, port: '18080', host: 'gotify.example.com' }, null]];
+
+  it('unwraps the [options, cb] array Node passes as a single argument', () => {
+    expect(unwrapConnectArgs(normalised)[0]).toEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({ host: 'gotify.example.com', port: '18080' }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a conventional argument list alone', () => {
+    expect(unwrapConnectArgs([{ host: 'a.example.com', port: 443 }])).toEqual([{ host: 'a.example.com', port: 443 }]);
+    expect(unwrapConnectArgs([443, 'a.example.com'])).toEqual([443, 'a.example.com']);
+  });
+
+  it('classifyConnect reads the REAL host out of it, not the localhost fallback', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect(normalised, isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'hostname', host: 'gotify.example.com' });
+  });
+
+  it('a normalised literal-IP target is still classified as an IP (so the private-IP block applies)', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([[{ port: 80, host: '169.254.169.254' }, null]], isIP)).toEqual({
+      kind: 'literal-ip',
+      host: '169.254.169.254',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('a normalised unix-socket target is still classified as local', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([[{ path: '/var/run/docker.sock' }, null]], isIP)).toEqual({
+      kind: 'local',
+      host: '/var/run/docker.sock',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('an undeclared host in normalised form is still refused by the allow-list', () => {
+    const allow = makeHostAllow(['gotify.example.com']);
+    const target = classifyConnect([[{ port: 80, host: 'evil.example.com' }, null]], isIP);
+    expect(allow(target.host)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});