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v3.0.16 — bug fixes (#964)
* fix(mcp): MCP RFC compliant for more strict clients * fix(mcp): serve flat /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource for ChatGPT reconnect Clients such as ChatGPT probe the flat well-known URL on every fresh discovery cycle (i.e. after a full disconnect/reconnect where cached OAuth state is cleared). The SDK's mcpAuthMetadataRouter only serves the path-based form /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp, so the flat probe returned 404. Without the resource metadata, ChatGPT fell back to the issuer URL as the resource parameter (https://…/ instead of https://…/mcp). The authorize handler then rejected it with invalid_target and redirected back to ChatGPT's callback with an error — showing the user the TREK home page instead of the consent form. Add an explicit GET handler for the flat URL that returns the same protected resource metadata, so the resource URI is discovered correctly on the first probe. * fix(mcp): fix OAuth popup blank page — SW denylist and COOP header Service worker was intercepting /oauth/authorize navigate requests (not in denylist), serving index.html, and React Router's catch-all redirected to / instead of the SDK authorize handler. Helmet's default COOP: same-origin isolated the /oauth/consent popup from its cross-origin opener, making window.opener null and breaking the popup-based OAuth completion signal for ChatGPT and similar clients. * fix(ntfy): encode non-Latin-1 header values with RFC 2047 to prevent ByteString crash Todo/trip names containing chars like → or € (and non-Latin-1 locale templates for Czech, Chinese, Russian, etc.) caused the Fetch API to throw when setting the ntfy Title header. Apply RFC 2047 base64 encoded-word encoding for any header value containing chars above U+00FF; ntfy decodes this automatically. * docs(mcp): document Cloudflare bot detection blocking ChatGPT MCP requests Add Cloudflare WAF note to MCP-Setup and a full troubleshooting entry covering root cause (IP reputation + UA heuristics), free-plan limitation (disable Bot Fight Mode entirely, with explicit warning), and paid-plan WAF skip rule with the full expression syntax and path table for all MCP/OAuth/.well-known routes. * fix(pwa): detect upstream proxy auth challenges and recover gracefully Behind Cloudflare Zero Trust or Pangolin, cross-origin auth redirects on /api/* calls surface as CORS errors (error.response === undefined) that the existing 401 interceptor never catches, leaving the PWA stuck with network-error toasts instead of re-authenticating. New connectivity module probes /api/health every 30s using fetch with cache:no-store and inspects Content-Type to reliably detect whether the server is reachable vs intercepted by an upstream proxy. axios interceptor changes: - On !error.response + navigator.onLine: run probeNow(); if the health probe also fails (proxy is intercepting all requests), trigger a guarded window.location.reload() so the edge proxy can intercept the top-level navigation and run its auth flow (covers CF Access and Pangolin 302 mode) - On error.response status 401 with text/html body: same reload path, covering Pangolin header-auth extended compatibility mode which returns 401+HTML instead of a 302 redirect. TREK own 401s are always JSON so there is no collision with the existing AUTH_REQUIRED branch. - sessionStorage flag prevents reload loops; cleared on any successful response so the guard resets after re-auth. /api/health excluded from SW NetworkFirst cache (vite.config.js regex) and Cache-Control: no-store added server-side so probes always hit the network and cannot be served stale from the 24h api-data cache. LoginPage caches last-known appConfig in localStorage so the SSO button renders in OIDC+UN/PW dual mode even when the config fetch is intercepted by the proxy. Auto-redirect to IdP skipped when config comes from cache to avoid redirect loops while the proxy is challenging. Fixes discussion #836. * fix(files): add bottom-nav padding to files tab wrapper on mobile * fix(budget): expose toolbar on mobile so users can add budget categories * fix(pwa): unregister SW before proxy-reauth reload so Pangolin can challenge WorkBox's NavigationRoute served the cached SPA shell on window.location.reload(), meaning Pangolin/CF Access never saw the navigation and the app was left stuck showing stale offline data. Unregistering the SW first lets the navigation reach the network so the upstream proxy can run its auth flow. Also rebuilds server/public with corrected sw.js (health excluded from NetworkFirst, /oauth/ and /.well-known/ added to NavigationRoute denylist). * chore: remove committed build artifacts from server/public Dockerfile and Proxmox community script both rebuild client/dist and copy it into server/public at build time — committed artifacts were never used. Replace with .gitkeep and add server/public/* to .gitignore. * chore: add build-from-sources script
This commit is contained in:
Julien G.
+35
-139
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import express, { Request, Response } from 'express';
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import { authenticate, requireCookieAuth, optionalAuth } from '../middleware/auth';
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import { AuthRequest, OptionalAuthRequest } from '../types';
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import { isAddonEnabled } from '../services/adminService';
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import { ALL_SCOPES, SCOPE_INFO } from '../mcp/scopes';
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import { ALL_SCOPES } from '../mcp/scopes';
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import { ADDON_IDS } from '../addons';
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import {
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validateAuthorizeRequest,
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@@ -14,16 +14,15 @@ import {
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revokeToken,
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verifyPKCE,
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authenticateClient,
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isValidRedirectUri,
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listOAuthClients,
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createOAuthClient,
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deleteOAuthClient,
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rotateOAuthClientSecret,
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listOAuthSessions,
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revokeSession,
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getUserByAccessToken,
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AuthorizeParams,
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} from '../services/oauthService';
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import { getAppUrl } from '../services/oidcService';
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import { writeAudit, getClientIp, logWarn } from '../services/auditLog';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -59,53 +58,18 @@ function makeRateLimiter(maxAttempts: number, windowMs: number, keyFn: (req: Req
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const tokenLimiter = makeRateLimiter(30, 60_000, (req) => `${req.ip}|${req.body?.client_id ?? ''}`);
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const validateLimiter = makeRateLimiter(30, 60_000, (req) => req.ip ?? 'unknown');
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const revokeLimiter = makeRateLimiter(10, 60_000, (req) => req.ip ?? 'unknown');
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const dcrLimiter = makeRateLimiter(10, 60_000, (req) => req.ip ?? 'unknown');
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Public router: /.well-known, /oauth/token, /oauth/revoke
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// Public router: /oauth/token and /oauth/revoke
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// (/.well-known and /oauth/register are now handled by SDK in app.ts)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export const oauthPublicRouter = express.Router();
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// RFC 8414 discovery document
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oauthPublicRouter.get('/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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// M2: return 404 (not 403) so feature presence isn't fingerprinted
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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const base = (getAppUrl() || '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
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res.json({
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issuer: base,
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authorization_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/authorize`,
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token_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/token`,
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revocation_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/revoke`,
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registration_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/register`,
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response_types_supported: ['code'],
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grant_types_supported: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
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code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
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token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_post', 'none'],
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scopes_supported: ALL_SCOPES,
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scope_descriptions: Object.fromEntries(
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ALL_SCOPES.map(s => [s, SCOPE_INFO[s].label])
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),
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resource_parameter_supported: true,
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});
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});
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// RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata
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oauthPublicRouter.get('/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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const base = (getAppUrl() || '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
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res.json({
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resource: `${base}/mcp`,
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authorization_servers: [base],
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bearer_methods_supported: ['header'],
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scopes_supported: ALL_SCOPES,
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resource_name: 'TREK MCP',
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});
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});
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// Token endpoint — handles authorization_code and refresh_token grants
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oauthPublicRouter.post('/oauth/token', tokenLimiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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// M1: RFC 6749 §5.1 — token responses must not be cached
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res.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
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res.set('Pragma', 'no-cache');
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@@ -115,10 +79,6 @@ oauthPublicRouter.post('/oauth/token', tokenLimiter, (req: Request, res: Respons
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const { grant_type, code, redirect_uri, client_id, client_secret, code_verifier, refresh_token, resource } = body;
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const ip = getClientIp(req);
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'mcp_disabled', error_description: 'MCP is not enabled' });
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}
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if (!client_id) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid_client', error_description: 'client_id is required' });
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}
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@@ -194,96 +154,32 @@ oauthPublicRouter.post('/oauth/token', tokenLimiter, (req: Request, res: Respons
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'unsupported_grant_type', error_description: `Unsupported grant_type: ${grant_type}` });
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});
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// RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration endpoint
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oauthPublicRouter.post('/oauth/register', dcrLimiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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// OIDC UserInfo endpoint (RFC 9068 / OpenID Connect Core §5.3)
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// ChatGPT hits this after OAuth to fetch the authenticated user's email for domain claiming.
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oauthPublicRouter.get('/oauth/userinfo', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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const body: Record<string, unknown> = typeof req.body === 'object' && req.body !== null ? req.body : {};
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const ip = getClientIp(req);
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const redirectUris: string[] = Array.isArray(body.redirect_uris) ? body.redirect_uris.filter((u): u is string => typeof u === 'string') : [];
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if (redirectUris.length === 0) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_redirect_uri', error_description: 'redirect_uris is required and must be a non-empty array' });
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const auth = req.headers['authorization'];
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if (!auth || !auth.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) {
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res.set('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer realm="TREK MCP"');
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid_token' });
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}
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// OAuth 2.1 + RFC 8252: confidential web apps need HTTPS; public
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// clients (MCP, native) are limited to loopback or a reverse-DNS
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// private-use scheme. This rejects `http://evil.example` DCR payloads
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// that today would otherwise be accepted since we previously only
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// checked shape. Dangerous URL schemes (`javascript:`, `data:` etc.)
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// are explicitly rejected — the authorize flow later 302s the
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// browser to this URI, which with `javascript:` would execute
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// attacker-controlled script under our redirect origin's context.
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const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = new Set([
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'javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:', 'file:', 'blob:', 'about:', 'chrome:', 'chrome-extension:',
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]);
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const allowed = redirectUris.every((u) => {
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try {
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const url = new URL(u);
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if (DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.has(url.protocol)) return false;
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if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;
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if (url.protocol === 'http:' && (url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1' || url.hostname === '[::1]')) return true;
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// RFC 8252 §7.1 private-use scheme: must be a reverse-DNS name
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// (e.g. `com.example.myapp:/callback`). Requiring a dot in the
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// scheme is a cheap heuristic that rules out bare `myapp:` and
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// `x:` one-off schemes the spec explicitly discourages.
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const schemeBody = url.protocol.slice(0, -1);
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if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*$/i.test(schemeBody) && schemeBody.includes('.')) return true;
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return false;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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});
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if (!allowed) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_redirect_uri', error_description: 'redirect_uris must be HTTPS, loopback HTTP, or a private custom scheme' });
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const token = auth.slice(7);
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const info = getUserByAccessToken(token);
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if (!info) {
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res.set('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer realm="TREK MCP", error="invalid_token"');
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid_token' });
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}
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const rawName = typeof body.client_name === 'string' ? body.client_name.trim().slice(0, 100) : '';
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const clientName = rawName || 'MCP Client';
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// Determine if the client wants to be public (no secret) — MCP clients typically use PKCE only
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const authMethod = typeof body.token_endpoint_auth_method === 'string' ? body.token_endpoint_auth_method : 'client_secret_post';
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const isPublic = authMethod === 'none';
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// Resolve requested scopes — scope is required; no implicit full-access grant
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if (typeof body.scope !== 'string' || body.scope.trim() === '') {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_client_metadata', error_description: 'scope is required' });
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}
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const rawScope = body.scope;
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const requestedScopes = rawScope.split(' ').filter(s => (ALL_SCOPES as string[]).includes(s));
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if (requestedScopes.length === 0) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_client_metadata', error_description: 'No valid scopes requested' });
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}
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const result = createOAuthClient(null, clientName, redirectUris, requestedScopes, ip, {
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isPublic,
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createdVia: 'dcr',
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});
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if (result.error) {
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return res.status(result.status || 400).json({ error: 'invalid_client_metadata', error_description: result.error });
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}
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const client = result.client!;
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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return res.status(201).json({
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client_id: client.client_id,
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...(client.client_secret ? { client_secret: client.client_secret, client_secret_expires_at: 0 } : {}),
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client_id_issued_at: now,
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redirect_uris: client.redirect_uris,
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grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
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response_types: ['code'],
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scope: (client.allowed_scopes as string[]).join(' '),
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client_name: client.name,
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token_endpoint_auth_method: isPublic ? 'none' : 'client_secret_post',
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return res.json({
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sub: String(info.user.id),
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email: info.user.email,
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email_verified: true,
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preferred_username: info.user.username,
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});
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});
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// Token revocation endpoint (RFC 7009)
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oauthPublicRouter.post('/oauth/revoke', revokeLimiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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// M2: return 404 when MCP is disabled
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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const body: Record<string, string> = typeof req.body === 'object' ? req.body : {};
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const { token, client_id, client_secret } = body;
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const ip = getClientIp(req);
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@@ -318,17 +214,17 @@ oauthApiRouter.get('/authorize/validate', validateLimiter, optionalAuth, (req: R
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const userId = (req as OptionalAuthRequest).user?.id ?? null;
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const result = validateAuthorizeRequest(
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{
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response_type: params.response_type || '',
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client_id: params.client_id || '',
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redirect_uri: params.redirect_uri || '',
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scope: params.scope || '',
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state: params.state,
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code_challenge: params.code_challenge || '',
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code_challenge_method: params.code_challenge_method || '',
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resource: typeof params.resource === 'string' ? params.resource : undefined,
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},
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userId,
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{
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response_type: params.response_type || '',
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client_id: params.client_id || '',
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redirect_uri: params.redirect_uri || '',
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scope: params.scope || '',
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state: params.state,
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code_challenge: params.code_challenge || '',
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code_challenge_method: params.code_challenge_method || '',
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resource: typeof params.resource === 'string' ? params.resource : undefined,
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},
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userId,
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);
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// H3: when caller is unauthenticated, strip client name / allowed_scopes from the response
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@@ -472,4 +368,4 @@ oauthApiRouter.delete('/sessions/:id', requireCookieAuth, (req: Request, res: Re
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const result = revokeSession(user.id, Number(req.params.id), getClientIp(req));
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if (result.error) return res.status(result.status || 400).json({ error: result.error });
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return res.json({ success: true });
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});
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});
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