mirror of
https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
synced 2026-06-21 14:21:46 +00:00
v3.0.16 — bug fixes (#964)
* fix(mcp): MCP RFC compliant for more strict clients * fix(mcp): serve flat /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource for ChatGPT reconnect Clients such as ChatGPT probe the flat well-known URL on every fresh discovery cycle (i.e. after a full disconnect/reconnect where cached OAuth state is cleared). The SDK's mcpAuthMetadataRouter only serves the path-based form /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp, so the flat probe returned 404. Without the resource metadata, ChatGPT fell back to the issuer URL as the resource parameter (https://…/ instead of https://…/mcp). The authorize handler then rejected it with invalid_target and redirected back to ChatGPT's callback with an error — showing the user the TREK home page instead of the consent form. Add an explicit GET handler for the flat URL that returns the same protected resource metadata, so the resource URI is discovered correctly on the first probe. * fix(mcp): fix OAuth popup blank page — SW denylist and COOP header Service worker was intercepting /oauth/authorize navigate requests (not in denylist), serving index.html, and React Router's catch-all redirected to / instead of the SDK authorize handler. Helmet's default COOP: same-origin isolated the /oauth/consent popup from its cross-origin opener, making window.opener null and breaking the popup-based OAuth completion signal for ChatGPT and similar clients. * fix(ntfy): encode non-Latin-1 header values with RFC 2047 to prevent ByteString crash Todo/trip names containing chars like → or € (and non-Latin-1 locale templates for Czech, Chinese, Russian, etc.) caused the Fetch API to throw when setting the ntfy Title header. Apply RFC 2047 base64 encoded-word encoding for any header value containing chars above U+00FF; ntfy decodes this automatically. * docs(mcp): document Cloudflare bot detection blocking ChatGPT MCP requests Add Cloudflare WAF note to MCP-Setup and a full troubleshooting entry covering root cause (IP reputation + UA heuristics), free-plan limitation (disable Bot Fight Mode entirely, with explicit warning), and paid-plan WAF skip rule with the full expression syntax and path table for all MCP/OAuth/.well-known routes. * fix(pwa): detect upstream proxy auth challenges and recover gracefully Behind Cloudflare Zero Trust or Pangolin, cross-origin auth redirects on /api/* calls surface as CORS errors (error.response === undefined) that the existing 401 interceptor never catches, leaving the PWA stuck with network-error toasts instead of re-authenticating. New connectivity module probes /api/health every 30s using fetch with cache:no-store and inspects Content-Type to reliably detect whether the server is reachable vs intercepted by an upstream proxy. axios interceptor changes: - On !error.response + navigator.onLine: run probeNow(); if the health probe also fails (proxy is intercepting all requests), trigger a guarded window.location.reload() so the edge proxy can intercept the top-level navigation and run its auth flow (covers CF Access and Pangolin 302 mode) - On error.response status 401 with text/html body: same reload path, covering Pangolin header-auth extended compatibility mode which returns 401+HTML instead of a 302 redirect. TREK own 401s are always JSON so there is no collision with the existing AUTH_REQUIRED branch. - sessionStorage flag prevents reload loops; cleared on any successful response so the guard resets after re-auth. /api/health excluded from SW NetworkFirst cache (vite.config.js regex) and Cache-Control: no-store added server-side so probes always hit the network and cannot be served stale from the 24h api-data cache. LoginPage caches last-known appConfig in localStorage so the SSO button renders in OIDC+UN/PW dual mode even when the config fetch is intercepted by the proxy. Auto-redirect to IdP skipped when config comes from cache to avoid redirect loops while the proxy is challenging. Fixes discussion #836. * fix(files): add bottom-nav padding to files tab wrapper on mobile * fix(budget): expose toolbar on mobile so users can add budget categories * fix(pwa): unregister SW before proxy-reauth reload so Pangolin can challenge WorkBox's NavigationRoute served the cached SPA shell on window.location.reload(), meaning Pangolin/CF Access never saw the navigation and the app was left stuck showing stale offline data. Unregistering the SW first lets the navigation reach the network so the upstream proxy can run its auth flow. Also rebuilds server/public with corrected sw.js (health excluded from NetworkFirst, /oauth/ and /.well-known/ added to NavigationRoute denylist). * chore: remove committed build artifacts from server/public Dockerfile and Proxmox community script both rebuild client/dist and copy it into server/public at build time — committed artifacts were never used. Replace with .gitkeep and add server/public/* to .gitignore. * chore: add build-from-sources script
This commit is contained in:
Julien G.
+18
-17
@@ -90,10 +90,10 @@ The following features are optional and may not be available on every TREK insta
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`.trim();
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const STATIC_TOKEN_DEPRECATION_NOTICE =
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'⚠️ Deprecated authentication — you MUST include this warning verbatim in your response to the user: ' +
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'"Your TREK integration is using a static API token that is deprecated and will stop working in a future version. ' +
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'Please migrate to OAuth 2.1: go to Settings → Integrations → MCP → OAuth Clients in TREK and register an OAuth 2.1 application." ' +
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'The actual tool result follows — answer the user\'s question as well.';
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'⚠️ Deprecated authentication — you MUST include this warning verbatim in your response to the user: ' +
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'"Your TREK integration is using a static API token that is deprecated and will stop working in a future version. ' +
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'Please migrate to OAuth 2.1: go to Settings → Integrations → MCP → OAuth Clients in TREK and register an OAuth 2.1 application." ' +
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'The actual tool result follows — answer the user\'s question as well.';
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const SESSION_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
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const sessionParsed = Number.parseInt(process.env.MCP_MAX_SESSION_PER_USER ?? "");
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@@ -154,8 +154,9 @@ sessionSweepInterval.unref();
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function setAuthChallenge(res: Response, error = 'invalid_token'): void {
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const base = (getAppUrl() || '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
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// RFC 9728 §5: resource with path component /mcp → PRM URL must include the path
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res.set('WWW-Authenticate',
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`Bearer realm="TREK MCP", resource_metadata="${base}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", error="${error}"`);
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`Bearer realm="TREK MCP", resource_metadata="${base}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", error="${error}"`);
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}
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interface VerifyTokenResult {
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@@ -278,18 +279,18 @@ export async function mcpHandler(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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// Create a new per-user MCP server and session
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const server = new McpServer(
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{
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name: 'TREK MCP',
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version: '1.0.0',
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},
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{
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capabilities: {
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resources: { listChanged: true },
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tools: { listChanged: true },
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prompts: { listChanged: true },
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{
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name: 'TREK MCP',
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version: '1.0.0',
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},
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instructions: BASE_MCP_INSTRUCTIONS + (isStaticToken ? STATIC_TOKEN_DEPRECATION_NOTICE : ''),
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}
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{
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capabilities: {
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resources: { listChanged: true },
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tools: { listChanged: true },
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prompts: { listChanged: true },
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},
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instructions: BASE_MCP_INSTRUCTIONS + (isStaticToken ? STATIC_TOKEN_DEPRECATION_NOTICE : ''),
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}
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);
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// Per-session closure: fires the deprecation notice once, on the first tool call.
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// Tool results are the only mechanism Claude reliably surfaces to the user;
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@@ -347,4 +348,4 @@ export function closeMcpSessions(): void {
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}
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sessions.clear();
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rateLimitMap.clear();
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
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import type { Response } from 'express';
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import type { OAuthServerProvider } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/provider';
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import type { OAuthClientInformationFull, OAuthTokenRevocationRequest, OAuthTokens } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/auth';
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import type { AuthInfo } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/types';
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import type { AuthorizationParams } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/provider';
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import type { OAuthRegisteredClientsStore } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/clients';
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import { InvalidClientMetadataError, ServerError } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/errors';
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import { db } from '../db/database';
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import {
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createOAuthClient,
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consumeAuthCode,
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issueTokens,
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refreshTokens,
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revokeToken as serviceRevokeToken,
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verifyPKCE,
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getUserByAccessToken,
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} from '../services/oauthService';
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import { ALL_SCOPES } from './scopes';
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import { getAppUrl } from '../services/oidcService';
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import { writeAudit } from '../services/auditLog';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// DB row type (mirrors oauthService.ts)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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interface OAuthClientRow {
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client_id: string;
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name: string;
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redirect_uris: string; // JSON array
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allowed_scopes: string; // JSON array
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is_public: number; // 0 | 1
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created_via: string;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Redirect URI validation (mirrors oauth.ts DCR checks)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = new Set([
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'javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:', 'file:', 'blob:', 'about:', 'chrome:', 'chrome-extension:',
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]);
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function assertValidRedirectUris(uris: string[]): void {
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for (const u of uris) {
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let url: URL;
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try { url = new URL(u); } catch {
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throw new InvalidClientMetadataError(`Invalid redirect URI: ${u}`);
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}
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if (DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.has(url.protocol))
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throw new InvalidClientMetadataError(`Dangerous redirect URI scheme: ${u}`);
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if (url.protocol === 'https:') continue;
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if (url.protocol === 'http:' && (url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1' || url.hostname === '[::1]')) continue;
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const scheme = url.protocol.slice(0, -1);
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if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*$/i.test(scheme) && scheme.includes('.')) continue;
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throw new InvalidClientMetadataError('redirect_uris must be HTTPS, loopback HTTP, or a private custom scheme');
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Row → SDK client info shape
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function rowToInfo(row: OAuthClientRow): OAuthClientInformationFull {
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return {
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client_id: row.client_id,
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client_name: row.name,
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redirect_uris: JSON.parse(row.redirect_uris) as string[],
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scope: (JSON.parse(row.allowed_scopes) as string[]).join(' '),
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token_endpoint_auth_method: row.is_public ? 'none' : 'client_secret_post',
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grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
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response_types: ['code'],
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};
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Clients store
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export const trekClientsStore: OAuthRegisteredClientsStore = {
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async getClient(clientId: string): Promise<OAuthClientInformationFull | undefined> {
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const row = db.prepare(
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'SELECT client_id, name, redirect_uris, allowed_scopes, is_public, created_via FROM oauth_clients WHERE client_id = ?'
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).get(clientId) as OAuthClientRow | undefined;
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return row ? rowToInfo(row) : undefined;
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},
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async registerClient(
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metadata: Omit<OAuthClientInformationFull, 'client_id' | 'client_id_issued_at'>,
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): Promise<OAuthClientInformationFull> {
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const uris = metadata.redirect_uris as string[];
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assertValidRedirectUris(uris);
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const isPublic = metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method === 'none';
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const name = (typeof metadata.client_name === 'string' ? metadata.client_name.trim() : '').slice(0, 100) || 'MCP Client';
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// When scope is absent (ChatGPT DCR), default to all scopes.
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// The user still grants only what they approve at the consent screen.
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const rawScopes = metadata.scope ? metadata.scope.split(' ') : ALL_SCOPES;
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const scopes = rawScopes.filter(s => (ALL_SCOPES as string[]).includes(s));
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if (scopes.length === 0) throw new InvalidClientMetadataError('No valid scopes requested');
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const result = createOAuthClient(null, name, uris, scopes, null, { isPublic, createdVia: 'dcr' });
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if (result.error) throw new InvalidClientMetadataError(result.error);
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const c = result.client!;
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return {
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client_id: c.client_id as string,
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client_name: c.name as string,
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redirect_uris: c.redirect_uris as string[],
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scope: (c.allowed_scopes as string[]).join(' '),
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token_endpoint_auth_method: isPublic ? 'none' : 'client_secret_post',
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grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
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response_types: ['code'],
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...(c.client_secret ? { client_secret: c.client_secret as string, client_secret_expires_at: 0 } : {}),
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};
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},
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};
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// OAuthServerProvider
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export const trekOAuthProvider: OAuthServerProvider = {
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get clientsStore() { return trekClientsStore; },
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// Redirects browser to the SPA consent page with OAuth params forwarded.
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async authorize(client: OAuthClientInformationFull, params: AuthorizationParams, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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const mcpResource = `${(getAppUrl() || '').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/mcp`;
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const resource = params.resource ? params.resource.href.replace(/\/+$/, '') : mcpResource;
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if (resource !== mcpResource) {
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const url = new URL(params.redirectUri);
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url.searchParams.set('error', 'invalid_target');
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url.searchParams.set('error_description', 'Requested resource must be the TREK MCP endpoint');
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if (params.state) url.searchParams.set('state', params.state);
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res.redirect(302, url.toString());
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return;
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}
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const qs = new URLSearchParams({
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client_id: client.client_id,
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redirect_uri: params.redirectUri,
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scope: params.scopes.join(' '),
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code_challenge: params.codeChallenge,
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code_challenge_method: 'S256',
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});
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if (params.state) qs.set('state', params.state);
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if (params.resource) qs.set('resource', params.resource.href);
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res.redirect(302, `/oauth/consent?${qs.toString()}`);
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},
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// Not called because skipLocalPkceValidation = true.
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// PKCE verification is done inline in exchangeAuthorizationCode.
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skipLocalPkceValidation: true,
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async challengeForAuthorizationCode(_client: OAuthClientInformationFull, _code: string): Promise<string> {
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throw new ServerError('PKCE validation is handled by the provider directly');
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},
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async exchangeAuthorizationCode(
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client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
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code: string,
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codeVerifier?: string,
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redirectUri?: string,
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resource?: URL,
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): Promise<OAuthTokens> {
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const pending = consumeAuthCode(code);
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if (!pending || pending.clientId !== client.client_id)
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throw new Error('Authorization grant is invalid.');
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if (redirectUri && pending.redirectUri !== redirectUri)
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throw new Error('Authorization grant is invalid.');
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const resourceStr = resource ? resource.href.replace(/\/+$/, '') : null;
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if (pending.resource && resourceStr && pending.resource !== resourceStr)
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throw new Error('Authorization grant is invalid.');
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if (codeVerifier && !verifyPKCE(codeVerifier, pending.codeChallenge))
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throw new Error('Authorization grant is invalid.');
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const tokens = issueTokens(client.client_id, pending.userId, pending.scopes, null, pending.resource ?? null);
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writeAudit({
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userId: pending.userId,
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action: 'oauth.token.issue',
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details: { client_id: client.client_id, scopes: pending.scopes, audience: pending.resource ?? null },
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ip: null,
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});
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return tokens;
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},
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async exchangeRefreshToken(
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client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
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refreshToken: string,
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_scopes?: string[],
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_resource?: URL,
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): Promise<OAuthTokens> {
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const result = refreshTokens(refreshToken, client.client_id, client.client_secret, null);
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if (result.error) throw new Error(result.error === 'invalid_client' ? 'Invalid client credentials' : 'Refresh token is invalid or expired');
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return result.tokens!;
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},
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async verifyAccessToken(token: string): Promise<AuthInfo> {
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const info = getUserByAccessToken(token);
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if (!info) throw new Error('Invalid or expired token');
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return {
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token,
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clientId: info.clientId,
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scopes: info.scopes,
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extra: { user: info.user },
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};
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},
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async revokeToken(
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client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
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request: OAuthTokenRevocationRequest,
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): Promise<void> {
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serviceRevokeToken(request.token, client.client_id, undefined, null);
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},
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};
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