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https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
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v3.0.16 — bug fixes (#964)
* fix(mcp): MCP RFC compliant for more strict clients * fix(mcp): serve flat /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource for ChatGPT reconnect Clients such as ChatGPT probe the flat well-known URL on every fresh discovery cycle (i.e. after a full disconnect/reconnect where cached OAuth state is cleared). The SDK's mcpAuthMetadataRouter only serves the path-based form /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp, so the flat probe returned 404. Without the resource metadata, ChatGPT fell back to the issuer URL as the resource parameter (https://…/ instead of https://…/mcp). The authorize handler then rejected it with invalid_target and redirected back to ChatGPT's callback with an error — showing the user the TREK home page instead of the consent form. Add an explicit GET handler for the flat URL that returns the same protected resource metadata, so the resource URI is discovered correctly on the first probe. * fix(mcp): fix OAuth popup blank page — SW denylist and COOP header Service worker was intercepting /oauth/authorize navigate requests (not in denylist), serving index.html, and React Router's catch-all redirected to / instead of the SDK authorize handler. Helmet's default COOP: same-origin isolated the /oauth/consent popup from its cross-origin opener, making window.opener null and breaking the popup-based OAuth completion signal for ChatGPT and similar clients. * fix(ntfy): encode non-Latin-1 header values with RFC 2047 to prevent ByteString crash Todo/trip names containing chars like → or € (and non-Latin-1 locale templates for Czech, Chinese, Russian, etc.) caused the Fetch API to throw when setting the ntfy Title header. Apply RFC 2047 base64 encoded-word encoding for any header value containing chars above U+00FF; ntfy decodes this automatically. * docs(mcp): document Cloudflare bot detection blocking ChatGPT MCP requests Add Cloudflare WAF note to MCP-Setup and a full troubleshooting entry covering root cause (IP reputation + UA heuristics), free-plan limitation (disable Bot Fight Mode entirely, with explicit warning), and paid-plan WAF skip rule with the full expression syntax and path table for all MCP/OAuth/.well-known routes. * fix(pwa): detect upstream proxy auth challenges and recover gracefully Behind Cloudflare Zero Trust or Pangolin, cross-origin auth redirects on /api/* calls surface as CORS errors (error.response === undefined) that the existing 401 interceptor never catches, leaving the PWA stuck with network-error toasts instead of re-authenticating. New connectivity module probes /api/health every 30s using fetch with cache:no-store and inspects Content-Type to reliably detect whether the server is reachable vs intercepted by an upstream proxy. axios interceptor changes: - On !error.response + navigator.onLine: run probeNow(); if the health probe also fails (proxy is intercepting all requests), trigger a guarded window.location.reload() so the edge proxy can intercept the top-level navigation and run its auth flow (covers CF Access and Pangolin 302 mode) - On error.response status 401 with text/html body: same reload path, covering Pangolin header-auth extended compatibility mode which returns 401+HTML instead of a 302 redirect. TREK own 401s are always JSON so there is no collision with the existing AUTH_REQUIRED branch. - sessionStorage flag prevents reload loops; cleared on any successful response so the guard resets after re-auth. /api/health excluded from SW NetworkFirst cache (vite.config.js regex) and Cache-Control: no-store added server-side so probes always hit the network and cannot be served stale from the 24h api-data cache. LoginPage caches last-known appConfig in localStorage so the SSO button renders in OIDC+UN/PW dual mode even when the config fetch is intercepted by the proxy. Auto-redirect to IdP skipped when config comes from cache to avoid redirect loops while the proxy is challenging. Fixes discussion #836. * fix(files): add bottom-nav padding to files tab wrapper on mobile * fix(budget): expose toolbar on mobile so users can add budget categories * fix(pwa): unregister SW before proxy-reauth reload so Pangolin can challenge WorkBox's NavigationRoute served the cached SPA shell on window.location.reload(), meaning Pangolin/CF Access never saw the navigation and the app was left stuck showing stale offline data. Unregistering the SW first lets the navigation reach the network so the upstream proxy can run its auth flow. Also rebuilds server/public with corrected sw.js (health excluded from NetworkFirst, /oauth/ and /.well-known/ added to NavigationRoute denylist). * chore: remove committed build artifacts from server/public Dockerfile and Proxmox community script both rebuild client/dist and copy it into server/public at build time — committed artifacts were never used. Replace with .gitkeep and add server/public/* to .gitignore. * chore: add build-from-sources script
This commit is contained in:
Julien G.
+147
-10
@@ -43,11 +43,18 @@ import journeyPublicRoutes from './routes/journeyPublic';
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import publicConfigRoutes from './routes/publicConfig';
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import systemNoticesRoutes from './routes/systemNotices';
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import { mcpHandler } from './mcp';
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import { trekOAuthProvider, trekClientsStore } from './mcp/oauthProvider';
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import { Addon } from './types';
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import { getPhotoProviderConfig } from './services/memories/helpersService';
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import { getCollabFeatures } from './services/adminService';
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import { isAddonEnabled } from './services/adminService';
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import { ADDON_IDS } from './addons';
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import { ALL_SCOPES } from './mcp/scopes';
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import { getAppUrl } from './services/oidcService';
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import { mcpAuthMetadataRouter } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/router';
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import { authorizationHandler } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/handlers/authorize';
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import { clientRegistrationHandler } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/handlers/register';
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import type { OAuthMetadata } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/auth';
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export function createApp(): express.Application {
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const app = express();
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@@ -58,8 +65,8 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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}
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const allowedOrigins = process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS
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? process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS.split(',').map(o => o.trim()).filter(Boolean)
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: null;
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? process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS.split(',').map(o => o.trim()).filter(Boolean)
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: null;
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let corsOrigin: cors.CorsOptions['origin'];
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if (allowedOrigins) {
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@@ -88,10 +95,27 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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const hstsActive = shouldForceHttps || process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
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const hstsIncludeSubdomains = process.env.HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS === 'true';
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// RFC 8414 / RFC 9728: discovery docs are world-readable — open CORS regardless of deployment config
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// RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 / RFC 7591: discovery docs and DCR are world-readable/writable.
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// /mcp needs open CORS so external MCP clients (ChatGPT, Claude.ai, Inspector) can call it
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// with Bearer tokens from any origin. /oauth/register and /oauth/authorize need it for
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// browser-based DCR/authorization preflights — the global cors({ origin: false }) would
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// answer OPTIONS without Access-Control-Allow-Origin before the SDK's own cors() runs.
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// All /.well-known/* paths get open CORS so clients probing openid-configuration or the
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// RFC 8414 path-suffixed AS metadata form don't get CORS-blocked (they get 404 JSON instead).
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app.use(
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['/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', '/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource'],
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cors({ origin: '*', credentials: false }),
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(req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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if (
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req.path.startsWith('/.well-known/') ||
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req.path === '/oauth/register' ||
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req.path === '/oauth/authorize' ||
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req.path === '/oauth/userinfo' ||
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req.path === '/mcp'
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) {
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cors({ origin: '*', credentials: false })(req, _res, next);
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} else {
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next();
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}
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},
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);
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app.use(cors({ origin: corsOrigin, credentials: true }));
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app.use(helmet({
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@@ -225,7 +249,7 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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if (!photo) return res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
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const share = db.prepare(
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"SELECT trip_id FROM share_tokens WHERE token = ? AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > datetime('now'))"
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"SELECT trip_id FROM share_tokens WHERE token = ? AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > datetime('now'))"
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).get(rawToken) as { trip_id: number } | undefined;
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if (!share || share.trip_id !== photo.trip_id) {
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return res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
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@@ -252,7 +276,10 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/collab', collabRoutes);
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app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/reservations', reservationsRoutes);
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app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/days/:dayId/notes', dayNotesRoutes);
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app.get('/api/health', (_req: Request, res: Response) => res.json({ status: 'ok' }));
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app.get('/api/health', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
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res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store, must-revalidate')
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res.json({ status: 'ok' })
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});
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app.use('/api/config', publicConfigRoutes);
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app.use('/api', assignmentsRoutes);
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app.use('/api/tags', tagsRoutes);
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@@ -340,16 +367,126 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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app.use('/api/notifications', notificationRoutes);
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app.use('/api', shareRoutes);
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// OAuth 2.1 — public endpoints (/.well-known, /oauth/token, /oauth/revoke)
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app.use('/', oauthPublicRouter);
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// OAuth 2.1 — public endpoints
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// Gate: 404 when MCP addon is disabled (M2 — prevents feature fingerprinting)
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const mcpAddonGate = (_req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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next();
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};
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// OAuth 2.1 — SPA-facing authenticated endpoints (/api/oauth/*)
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// Mounted first: per-route 403 checks inside oauthApiRouter are the gate, not mcpAddonGate
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app.use('/api/oauth', oauthApiRouter);
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// SDK metadata router — built lazily on first request so getAppUrl() (which queries the DB)
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// is not called at createApp() time, before test tables have been created.
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// mcpAuthMetadataRouter serves:
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// /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server — RFC 8414 AS metadata
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// /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp — RFC 9728 path-based PRM (fixes issue #959 bug 1)
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let _oauthMetadata: OAuthMetadata | null = null;
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let _sdkMetaRouter: express.Router | null = null;
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function getOAuthMetadata(): OAuthMetadata {
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if (_oauthMetadata) return _oauthMetadata;
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const base = (getAppUrl() || 'http://localhost:3001').replace(/\/+$/, '');
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_oauthMetadata = {
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issuer: base,
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authorization_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/authorize`,
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token_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/token`,
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revocation_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/revoke`,
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registration_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/register`,
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response_types_supported: ['code'],
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grant_types_supported: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
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code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
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token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_post', 'none'],
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scopes_supported: ALL_SCOPES,
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};
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return _oauthMetadata;
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}
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function getMetaRouter(): express.Router {
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if (_sdkMetaRouter) return _sdkMetaRouter;
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const metadata = getOAuthMetadata();
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_sdkMetaRouter = mcpAuthMetadataRouter({
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oauthMetadata: metadata,
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resourceServerUrl: new URL(`${metadata.issuer}/mcp`),
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scopesSupported: ALL_SCOPES as string[],
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resourceName: 'TREK MCP',
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});
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return _sdkMetaRouter;
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}
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// Path-aware gate: only /.well-known/* returns 404 when disabled; other paths pass through
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// so static files and SPA routes are unaffected when MCP is off.
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app.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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const isMetadataPath =
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req.path === '/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server' ||
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req.path === '/.well-known/openid-configuration' ||
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req.path.startsWith('/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource');
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if (isMetadataPath && !isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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getMetaRouter()(req, res, next);
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});
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// ChatGPT (and other OIDC-first clients) bootstrap OAuth discovery via
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// /.well-known/openid-configuration. Serve the AS metadata plus the OIDC
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// userinfo_endpoint so ChatGPT can fetch the authenticated user's email
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// for authorization domain claiming.
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app.get('/.well-known/openid-configuration', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const meta = getOAuthMetadata();
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res.json({
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...meta,
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userinfo_endpoint: `${meta.issuer}/oauth/userinfo`,
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});
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});
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// RFC 9728 flat well-known URL — served alongside the path-based form the SDK already provides.
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// Clients like ChatGPT probe /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (no path suffix) on every
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// fresh discovery. Without this, they get 404, fall back to the issuer URL as the resource
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// parameter, and the authorize handler rejects them with invalid_target — showing the user
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// the TREK home page instead of the consent form.
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app.get('/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
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if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.MCP)) return res.status(404).end();
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const meta = getOAuthMetadata();
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res.json({
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resource: `${meta.issuer}/mcp`,
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authorization_servers: [meta.issuer],
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bearer_methods_supported: ['header'],
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scopes_supported: ALL_SCOPES,
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resource_name: 'TREK MCP',
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});
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});
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// SDK authorize handler: validates OAuth params, calls provider.authorize() which redirects
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// to the SPA consent page at /oauth/consent
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app.use('/oauth/authorize', mcpAddonGate, authorizationHandler({ provider: trekOAuthProvider }));
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// SDK DCR handler: accepts registrations without scope (fixes issue #959 bug 2)
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app.use('/oauth/register', mcpAddonGate, clientRegistrationHandler({ clientsStore: trekClientsStore }));
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// Token and revoke keep TREK's own handlers (timing-safe hash comparison not supported by SDK clientAuth)
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// oauthPublicRouter has per-route isAddonEnabled checks; no blanket gate needed here
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app.use('/', oauthPublicRouter);
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// MCP endpoint
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app.post('/mcp', mcpHandler);
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app.get('/mcp', mcpHandler);
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app.delete('/mcp', mcpHandler);
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// Return 404 JSON for any /.well-known/* path the SDK metadata router doesn't handle.
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// Without this, the SPA catch-all serves HTML — clients probing
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// /.well-known/openid-configuration or the RFC 8414 path-suffixed AS metadata URL
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// receive a 200 HTML response they can't parse as JSON, causing "does not implement OAuth".
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app.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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if (req.path.startsWith('/.well-known/')) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'not_found' });
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next();
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});
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// Helmet's COOP: same-origin isolates the consent popup from its cross-origin opener (ChatGPT etc.), making window.opener null and breaking the OAuth flow.
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app.use('/oauth/consent', (_req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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res.setHeader('Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy', 'unsafe-none');
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next();
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});
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// Production static file serving
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if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
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const publicPath = path.join(__dirname, '../public');
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@@ -380,4 +517,4 @@ export function createApp(): express.Application {
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});
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return app;
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}
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}
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